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     This Symposium was organized for the discussion of Professor Eisen-
stadt's thought-provoking book on Japanese Civilization; A Comparative View, 
that has been recently published by the University of Chicago Press. The work 
is based upon the fundamental conceptual contrast between the rise of Axial Civi-
lizations such as that of China, Europe, and India, which were defined by the 
universalistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism 
and experienced the tension between the transcendental and the mundane, versus, 
the pre-existing Non Axial civilizations that reflected the particularistic cultural 
self conceptualization of local communities. These communities organized as 
tribal orders and reflected ethno-communal animistic religious traditions. Non 
Axial civilizations tended to be dominated by the institutions and cultures of 
Axial civilizations as in the case of the Germans who converted to Christianity or 
the Turks who converted to Islam. Others were pushed out of the margins of 
history such as in the case of the Mongols. Japan is the only Non Axial Civiliza-
tion that has given birth to a continuous, autonomous history which produced a 
sophisticated culture that can only be found in Axial Civilizations. According to 
Professor Eisenstadt, it is this "unique" character of Japanese history that explains 
the strong inclinations toward the Japanization of processes of change particularly 
during the revolutionary transitions that entail the acceptance of Axial Civiliza-
tions. Such processes can be recognised in the case of the acceptance of Chinese 
Civilization in the seventh century and in the case of the acceptance of Western 
Civilization in the construction of Japanese Modernity. The voluminous work 
that handles Japanese Civilization from its Antiquity to the rise of Modern Japan 
with the 1868 Meiji Restoration is structured as a comparative study with 
Europe, China, India and other historical experiences that situates Japan in a 
global historical framework. The contention of the author is to take Japan analy-
sis out of its familiar restrictions of an Euro-centred bilateral contrast or the 
parochial Nihonjin ron or Japaneseness approach and in turn explain the character 
of Japanese Civilization in a truly multi-faceted comparative framework.
A work of this magnitude is an important opportunityto discuss the
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larger questions of methodology in social sciences that is not simply related to 
the study of Japanese Civilization. Here a number of issues come to mind that 
invite a discussion of methodology together with an evaluation of this 
monumental work, Japanese Civilization. First, the book makes it once more 
clear that we need to develop a fruitful systematic method of collaboration be-
tween social scientists who are interested in general patterns of human behaviour 
and the specialists such as historians, anthropologists, economists and so on of a 
particular area of study. In this case, it is obvious that the two groups have 
advantages and disadvantages which need to be framed in a positive collaboration 
network in order to co join the strong points of both approaches. The social sci-
entists who ask questions of magnitude such as those of Professor Eisenstadt are 
able to construct a debating platform about the global context of human history 
that attempts to decipher the outlines of general and universalistic societal forms 
which relates to patterns of change which the specialist detects in local and re-
gional context. The advantage of such a universalistic approach is the effort at 
trying to understand cultural behaviour in a comparative framework that will 
provide an explanation that can go beyond the terms of the culture itself. The 
method will therefore enable the expansion of the horizons of reflection about a 
particular culture in this case that of Japan by subjecting Japanese historical narra-
tive to questions of Axiality, Non Axiality that have a universal platform. On 
the other hand, the specialist as in the case of those who work in Japanese Stu-
dies, has the advantage of language skills, the use of local sources, that breeds 
familiarity with the internal discourse of the culture about itself in studies about 
the politics, religion, culture and so on of the Japanese people. 
     The advantages and disadvantages of the two different methods are clear 
in Professor Eisenstadt's book about Japanese Civilization. By the very nature of 
the requirement that the social scientist has to rely on the studies of the Area spe-
cialist of Japan, the author has to use these secondary sources on Japanese society 
as primary sources without practicing "internal criticism" of documents that the 
father of modern history Leopold von Ranke advocated for the construction of a 
historical narrative by a scientific method. While as historians, we may no lon-
ger be so confident about the scientificity of Ranke's historical methodology that 
relied heavily on the use of primary sources and a naive belief from our perspec-
tive on the uncontested ability of the written document to tell history as it actual-
ly was, still most students of history know that the written word contains not 
just information but also an argument about the information which imbeds the 
subjective perspective of the source. Thus, while the discussion of Japanese Civi-
lization is based upon the series of studies of Japan specialists, the author cannot 
penetrate into the historiography of the literature that serves as the foundation of
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the book's argument. On the one hand, the debate within the field of Japanese 
studies between different generations of scholars in Japan and in the English lan-
guage literature produced primarily in the United States, or, the possibility of 
factual weaknesses or mistakes in the literature of the specialist, do not /can not 
enter into the analytical framework of the social scientist's evaluation. On the 
other hand, the specialist may have the advantage of being sensitized to the ex-
isting discourse about Japan as a separate phenomena than the information about 
various aspects of Japanese behaviour. However the specialist such as myself 
may end up so engrossed in the particulars of the world that one has chosen to 
study that such universalistic issues at the level of Professor Eisenstadt's work 
escape our attention. Furthermore, Japanese studies publications will reflect the 
limited vision of the author about any comparative framework. For example, 
Western scholars of Japan will sometimes posit a concept of the West as a con-
trasting or comparative framework to that of Japan for the sake of comparative 
analysis that remains superficial at the level of "we in the West" or "in contrast to 
the West" simply on the basis of being a native member of the western world. 
And this self-confidence of positing the West as a comparative frame in the hands 
of the specialist is sometimes done without a clear picture of the state of the art 
in the historiography about the construction of history of the processes about the 
so-called Western World. In this sense, Professor Eisenstadt's work is superior to 
that of many specialists for the author sets the comparative analysis of Japanese 
Civilization in a systematic framework that discusses at length the various com-
ponents of comparison within a conscious rational understanding of the history 
of the idea of the West in its own discourse. 
     However, how do we solve the problems which are inherent in both 
approaches? I think that Professor Eisenstad's work can provide an opportunity 
to discuss the possibilities of devising a new framework of collaboration between 
social scientists and the specialists in Area Studies. My suggestion would be that 
a monumental study such as this one about Japanese Civilization would have be-
nefited greatly if there was a process of collective interaction between the special-
ists and the author to expose the questions of debate and the pitfalls of the spe-
cialist literature prior to the preparation of the work. I am thinking in terms of 
possible committees, or workshops that bring the two types of minds together to 
help the construction of the narrative by the author. This indicates our need to 
restructure our approach to Area Studies. 
      The framework of Area Studies which was formed in the post-war period 
and was primarily a product of the development of scholarship in the United 
States now needs to be reconsidered to handle new and different questions. It is 
clear that the existing framework lacks the ability to infuse Area Studies with the 
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currents in theory and other fields of study so much so that an approach that was 
supposed to enrich the understanding of a particular culture such as that of Japan 
now exhibits the character of a limited and familiar debate about Japan in which 
almost the same themes come back and back again: Nihonjinron, Japanese mod-
ernity, conflict versus harmony, feudalism, uniqueness versus universality. The 
framework is always the West as a monolithic entity which is frequently the Un-
ited States in the back of the minds of the authors. However, surely Japan will 
look different if the comparative framework and the questions of the study of 
Japan are asked for example from the history of the monarchy in Europe, the 
caste tradition in India, the empires of the Near East. 
      Professor Eisenstadt has brought emphasis on an important thesis for the 
understanding of the history of modern civilization as the relationship between 
state and society. In the case of Japan, his argument stresses the primary role of 
the state and the relative weakness of an autonomous civil soeiety, which con-
trasts the Japanese experience with that of Western Europe, United States, and 
Canada taken to represent the West. Basing its roots in the highly regulatory 
character of the Tokugawa state during the Japanese history of feudalism, in 
Eisenstadt's view, the Meiji state and its vestiges create an image of Japanese 
modernity which is unique in the sense that it derives from the dominance of 
state structures, state oriented elites and counter-elites, and political networking 
which is concurrent with a relatively weak civil society. This historical situation 
is argued to be unique to Japan due to its Non-Axial civilization that is not 
rooted in an Axial civilization with universalistic principles, and has resulted in 
the "conflation of state and civil society within the broader national community". 
1/(Eisenstadt, p.35). 
     The theme of Japan's modernity and its post war democracy as a highly 
regulated form of a modern capitalist society that contrasts with the asssumption 
of the separation of state and a civil society capable of an autonomous political/ 
economic/social history in the West is perhaps the most significant thesis of the 
study in terms of understanding the variations in the global history of modernity 
in our age. Since the second half of the nineteenth century the global history of 
modernity is not only continuing in the societies ideologically and historically 
accepted to be part of the West but it is also increasingly shifting to the region of 
the late developers or the newly developing societies of the Non-West, namely 
those countries in Asia and other continents that have became integrated into the 
world system that was inititally formed with the rise of the West. 
      The book argues, most Western scholars seem to have difficulty under-
standing the basic cultural and institutional feautures of modernity as it developed 
in Japan, especially its status as a highly controlled yet non-totalitarian, indeed,
226
                            Commentary for the General Discussion on Japan in a Comparative Perspective 
formally and to some extent actually democratic society. This observation of 
Professor Eisenstadt is very important for it points to a common intellectual bar-
rier in the minds of Western scholarship on Japan in which frequently the idea of 
the West in the mind of the student of Japan is a pristine vision of the West 
which lacks the decontruction of the ideology of being Western. This vision 
which forms the contrasting "other" for Japan (one can cite other entities such as 
India, China, and so on as well) is often derived from the intellectual and ideolo-
gical idealization of the political process in the compressed idea of the vision of 
the West that is derived from the intellectual heritage of Western thought. It is 
frequently the idea of the West as we have learned from such great savants as 
Locke, and Hobbes who form our ideas for the idea of democracy, liberty, con-
stitutionalism, or, our concepts for the role of rational bureaucracy and the in-
dustrial urban classes as seen in Weber and Marx in the construction of moderni-
ty in the West. The idea of the West is used without a clear discussion of the in-
tellectual paradigm itself or an awareness of the historical complications of the 
actual praxis of these ideals in action in the history of the West. Therefore, those 
who have difficulty in understanding Japanese political behavior, contrast it to the 
ideal of politics in the image of the West. They probably would have difficulty 
in understanding the actual historical experience of the societies that are seen as 
part of the West which frequently contrasted with the ideal models of the great 
Western savants themselves. 
     I would like to discuss this issue with an example from the book. Profes-
sor Eisenstadt cites the difficulty of most Western scholars to understand the 
workings of Japanese politics in Western terms. One suggestion would be that in 
order to overcome the difficulty in understanding Japanese parliamentary politics, 
it would be perhaps more relevant to study the practice of politics in the history 
of prewar and postwar Italy, and take into account the role of the United States 
in Italy in the immediate post-war period, the political domination of Christian 
Democrats in national governments in the post-war period despite the visibility 
of Socialists and Communists in local Italian politics, and an informal network of 
power holders as seen in Italian regional politics which remain in the hands of 
"unofficial /unlawful" forces such as that of the Mafia. Such a comparative study 
might explain better the seemingly mysterious workings of decision-making in 
Japanese politics that is argued to be based on behind the scenes negotiations 
between differents participants, and the accommodative tendency of the ruling 
party to the opposition, all of which represent the weakness of an ideological 
dimension. 2/(Eisenstadt, p.150) 
      This comment does not intend to bring out a strong counter-argument 
that the Japanese due process of politics does not have its culturally defined 
                             227
Selcuk ESENBEL 
modes of behavior. It is just that frequently much of the assumptions of Western 
oriented scholarship on Japan inflates the conceptural framework of uniqueness or 
Japaneseness because of an analytical framework that takes a "should" be 
approach of a pristine image of politics in a monolithic idea of the Modern West. 
The idea of the West is frequently not dominated by countries such as Italy or 
Spain which are also part of the history of the modern West, but probably by 
the perception of the experience as an ideal in the United States. The work of 
Harumi Befu and Josef Kreiner on the variations in the model of Japan in 
different cultural and generational environments has been an important correc-
tive step in questioning this binary opposition of the idea of the West versus 
Japan in contemporary scholarship by showing its historiographic process. 
3/(Harumi Befu and Josef Kreiner, Othernesses of Japan: Historical and Cultural 
Influences on Japanese Studies in Ten Countries (Munchen: Monographien Band 
I Harausgegeben vom Deutschen Institut fur Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-
Siebold-Stiftung, 1992)) 
      Recent scholarship on the Middle East is also concerned with the debate 
on the similar issue of what if there was any role of Civil Society in the Middle 
East. It is significant to note that the recent study edited by Augustus Richard 
Norton begins with a critical discussion of Max Weber's brief remarks on the na-
ture of Islamic urban life. Lacking what he considered to be the decisive feature 
of formally organized urban communes (Gemeinde), he disqualified Middle East-
ern cities from consideration as autonomous political units, unlike the cities of 
mediaeval Europe. 4/(Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle 
East, Volume Two (Leiden E. J. Brill, 1996), p.xi) The whole argument of the 
work is to show that there were and still are civilian networks, organizations, in-
stitutions which function as a kind of civil society in the Middle East. The arti-
cles try to counter the Weberian image by deciphering local /indigenous historical 
phenomena that extends the definition of civil society to a comparable common 
platform. 
      Thus Professor Eisenstadt's concern in attempting to explain the relation of 
state and civil society in Japan in a historical and sociological comparative pers-
pective can be understood as the reflection of an intellectual movement to over-
come two binary propositions about Japanese Civilization: The classical rejection 
of the cultures outside of the West including that of Japan is the explanation of 
the idea of Modernity. This Euro-centered /Orientalist view was developed by 
the great Western thinkers of the nineteenth century such as Marx/Weber and 
others. However, the Occidentalist counter argument was also developed by the 
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Asian thinkers who were frequently well-versed in Western thought and were 
motivated by the search for a national identity in their own modern experience. 
The counter-argument for unique Japaneseness, nihonjinron, developed by 
Japanese thinkers which challenged the nineteenth century western rejection of 
Non-Western forms of modernity by an alternative and nationalist explanation of 
modernity is quite typical of the critical Occidentalist mode. I would suggest 
that Professor Eisenstadt's work that takes Axiality / Non Axiality as a basic uni-
versalistic paradigm which makes Japan unique but explainable beyond the 
nationalist perspective, and the articles of the Norton volume on the Middle East 
that seek to redefine the idea of civil society in Islamic turf, represent a trend in 
Western scholarship that intends to "decipher" in new terms the role of Non-
Western civil society/societies that aims to cut across the above binary opposites 
perspective. However, it is also clear that in these works, the centrality of the 
conceptualization of state and society is clearly derived from the Western idea of 
the history of the political economy of modern Western civilization which argues 
that civil society has been crucial for the emergence of the modernity of politics 
in terms of liberty and democracy: Civil society is seen as the embodiment of 
autonomous, self-regulating institutions that have the potential to be the founda-
tion of self government and democracy that can counter the power of the state.
     Here, I would argue that the image of the potent role of the state and the 
relative weakness of civil society that is acknowledged as a major aspect of 
Japanese modernity by Professor Eisenstadt is in need of discussion. This is in 
view of the importance of the relation constructed between the state and civil 
society in the political economy of the politics of modernity as defined above. I 
would like to begin with a question about the book's evaluation which sees an 
imposing role of the state in Japan throughout its history that exhibits itself as the 
conflation of state and society with historical deep-set roots. Needless to say, 
there has always been a sense of unity between the culture of civil society and 
that of Japanese polity during the time of the Yamato state as well as the later 
Heian court or the feudal governments in so far as sharing the idea of a culturally 
and ethnically homogenious tradition. And it is also convincing to argue that the 
idea of national polity, kokutai, as it was argued by the Japanese, especially the 
nationalist Mito school during the Tokugawa period and later by the Meiji think-
ers entails the unity of state and society under the sacral entity of the Emperors 
without a clear line of division between state and society. But, according to my 
understanding, the Japanese state "forced" a conflation of state and society by and 
large as a result of the state building process after the 1868 Meiji Restoration. 
The relationship of the Tokugawa state to the "non-state" civil society of feudal 
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Japan, if the feudal class structure and the institutions of the commoner popula-
tion of merchants, peasants, and artisans in the town and the village can by seen 
as part of Japanese civil society, was quite ambivalent. In the words of Philip 
Brown, the early modern state in Japan exercised the mannerisms of a flam-
boyant state with great claims to authority but when it came to practice there 
was great acceptance of autonomy and diversity which was exercised by the non-
state institutions of society. In my opinion as well, the Tokugawa state's stance 
toward the village which housed more than 80 percent of the civilian population, 
existed in a great deal of autonomous political/ economic/ social space which left 
the peasants in self-governing bodies as long as they were not rebellious. It is 
noteworthy that in the case of rebellions as well, while the feudal authorities lost 
no time in suppressing them, in actuality, many of their demands were accepted. 
This was not because of a voluntary choice on behalf of especially the Tokugawa 
Shogunate to be particulary nice to peasants (a contradiction in terms in any 
feudal polity) but it was due to the "limits" of state power in view of the auton-
omy of the countryside in historical terms. In my opinion, by destroying and 
reorganizing Japanese society, both its towns and villages, for the sake of mod-
ernity, the Meiji state, modeled on the nineteenth century European nation state, 
instigated this conflation of society into the state power structure. 5/(Philip 
Brown, Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Mod-
ern Japan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Selcuk Esenbel, Even the 
Gods Rebel: Peasants of Takaino and the 1871 Nakano Uprising (The Association 
for Asian Studies Monograph, 1998); James W. White, Ikki: Social Conflict and 
Political Protest in Early Modern Japan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995)) 
      We have to consider this idea of the conflation of state and society in a 
country such as Japan as also reflective of the compression of time and space in 
our imagination of the modern experience. In contrast to the eighteenth century 
and even the nineteenth century which was dominated by the transportation and 
communications technology of the clipper ships and pony expresses, only to be 
quickened by the introduction of railroads and other automotive means in its 
later phases, the twentieth century has been a turbulent and fast moving process 
in our imagination both with its World Wars, Holocausts as well as automobiles, 
jet planes, satellites, and now the internet. Eric Hobsbawm has astutely touched 
upon this quickening process in our minds by the title of his recent work on the 
twentieth century as the Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century. 
6/(Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 
(London: Abacus, 1996)). Here, I would also argue that the compression of time 
in our imagination about the twentieth century is also due to the extraordinary 
expansion in the role of the state in the hands of power holders to manipulate 
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everyday life for the construction of modern industrial civilization in twentieth 
century terms-this relates to the extraordinary domination of the state over socie-
ty that the author notes in the history of modern Japan even compared to Ger-
many and Turkey. The acceleration in the potency of the state to control society 
in the twentieth century contrasts with the historical process of the industrial 
revolution as we note it in Europe starting with England and its gradual spread 
to the continent. We should remind ourselves that our century has experienced a 
re-industrialization process with the strong intervention/ guidance of the state in 
view of the World Wars and the Great Depression that makes the image of an 
Adam Smithian vision of the gradual and evolutionary emergence of market eco-
nomy, the English Industrial Revolution of the merchant industrialists of the 
cities of Lancaster or Manchester, recede back in our memory as slow-moving 
times. Furthermore, it is not just late developers such as Germany, Japan and 
Turkey that have relied on state mechanisms and the systematic manipulation of 
so-called civil society for constructing a modern industrial civilization but when 
looked at carefully, the New Deal of the United States, the Stalinist Industial Re-
volution of the Soviet Union, have many things in common with the experience 
of Japan or for that matter the other so-called late-developers in magnifying the 
role of the state over that of civil society. I am not suggesting that the experi-
ence of the United States, Soviet Union, or Japan are identical, but one suspects 
that there was a lot of conflation of society into the state in the bastions of the 
West that frequently do not enter into analysis. 
      Furthermore, in such situations as that of Japan and Turkey the process of 
civilization in the terms of Norbert Elias has a double-burden of constructing 
modern industrial civilization as not only a means of integration into the modern 
age but also as a means for national resistance against Western imperialism and 
domination in cultural terms. The enigmatic character of Asian nationalism 
should be taken into account to explain the lack of serious ideological differences 
on universalistic principles in politics: Frequently it is not the lack of principle, 
but the existence of the nationalist perceptions that have given priority to the 
principle of resistance against the West over the political principles of the left or 
the right in political behavior that has colored the state engineered modernities in 
Japan and Turkey to seem as "a conflation of state and society". Both societies 
have their share of political behavior that does not look quite explainable from 
the perspective of the ideological left and the right as defined by Western political 
thought. For example, the contradiction of the need for a nationalist agenda 
against the West in the politics of modern industrial civilization explains why 
sometimes outside observers find it difficult to explain the existence of Japanese 
Marxists who collaborated with prewar militarists by serving in the South 
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Manchurian Research Organization that was an arm of Japanese imperialism in 
Manchuria, or that some even "converted" to nationalist causes. To explain such 
behavior as simply the ambivalence of principle in Japanese political behavior is 
not a sufficient explanation to the ears of the historian. The recent work of 
Louise Young on Japan's total empire shows us the inside story of how the con-
struction of Manchukuo in the thirties was not the conspiracy of a few wild 
nationalist officers but actually entailed the collaboration of a wide range of "civil 
society" groups. Many leftists and liberals as well as nationalists saw Manchukuo 
as a utopia for a settler's paradise, the actualization of a Modern Asia that was an 
alternative to the British Baj, Dutch or the French Indo-China or the Foreign 
Settlements in Shanghai that dominated for a long time the form of modernity 
for the Asians. 7/(Louise Young, Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Cul-
ture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)). 
     Similarly, observers of modern Turkish history have found it difficult to 
explain the lack of "principled behavior" by sections of the Republic of Turkey 
after its foundation in 1923. The observers have frequently commented on the 
collaboration of former Marxist intellectuals with the cause of the Turkish re-
volution. Even the neutrality of the government during the Second World War 
which astutely played the Allies against Germany and remain a non-belligerent 
state in a policy of active neutrality has been at times criticized as an unprincipled 
behaviour for not having taken a firm stance against faschism. 8/(Selim Deringil, 
Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War. An Active Neutrality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.185 for criticism of foreign 
policy) The seemingly ambivalent forms of political behavior in Turkish politics 
as cited above can only be understood in the context of the nationalist ideology 
of the young Republican generation which sought to construct a western style 
state to save the nation in their minds from the dangers of colonialization by the 
western empires after the destruction of the Ottoman empire at the end of the 
First World War.
      Therefore, sometimes the complexity of twentieth century history explains 
better the behavior of "Orientals" such as the Japanese or the Turks than compar-
ative analyses of specialists in Area Studies which pose structural contrasts with 
the West. To give a similar example again from Japanese Civilization, in Japan 
the ruling party's accomodative stance and the weakness of the opposion in 
Japanese politics is seen as derived of a Japanese cultural norm in addition to the 
structure of the parliamentary system. Here, Eisenstadt's work refers to the eval-
uation of specialists who cite the prevalence of the ruling party's accomodation 
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to the politics of the disarmament treaty by adopting the politics of the opposi-
tion as their own. From the historical perspective, we should remember that 
Japan's prewar and immediate post-war developments made a profound impact in 
the minds of the post-war conservative ruling circles who firmly believed that the 
revival of a militarist Japan would be lethal for the future of the county even 
though they may have found the prewar ideological currents of nationalism not 
completely anathema at the time. Thus, this curious accomodation between rul-
ing circles and the opposition is not so much a "cultural phenomenon" but it is 
quite understandable in view of the prevalence of a consensus in the post-war 
generation of ruling conservative circles of Japan for avoiding the resurgance of 
militarism and the economic drain of remilitarization after the "dark valley" of 
the thirties and forties. The conservative Yoshida Shigeru's vision of Japan's 
need to reconstruct her economy by making sure that the countries of south and 
southeast Asia would not conclude that Japan was returning to the path of mili-
tarism and the hope for the eventual expansion of economic relations with China 
is historically the immediate background to the seemingly close relations between 
the ruling circles and the opposition over the disarmament treaty rather than any 
anthropological explanation of Japanese political behavior. 9/(J. W. Dower, 
Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 
(Cambridge (Massachusetts): Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Universi-
ty, 1988), pp.387-388). 
     My final point in this general discussion of the symposium that is inspired 
from the monumental work of Professor Eisenstadt is that the vision of the 
Japanese generations that were involved in the construction of Japan's modernity 
in modern times makes more sense as a twentieth century modernist vision than 
an early nineteenth century one: this explaines the contradiction in the strong pri-
mordial, sacral vision of Japanese modernity as lacking a universal message. My 
personal desire for the work of Professor Eisenstadt's work on Japanese Civiliza-
tion, especially the sections dealing with the period after the 1868 Meiji Restora-
tion would have been to include the political / ideological / intellectual voice of 
the Meiji-Taisho-Showa Japanese individuals, for this collection of voices was 
very universalistic in claim while concerned at the same time by the need for a 
nationalist self definition though the primordial, ascriptive, sacral, natural terms 
of the native culture in the words of the book. Professor Eisenstadt hits an im-
portant point by bringing on the stage of Japanese modernity the role of the 
terms of the primordial, ascriptive, sacral, natural, and hierachal understanding of 
modernity in Japanese society. The reference to the primacy of the sacral and 
primordial terms of Japanese identity in modernity refreshes our memory by 
reminding us of the importance of Shintoism, Emperor-based nationalism, the
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sacral / mythical basis for Japanese imperialism as part of Japanese modernity and 
the unique connection between the idea of ethnic homogeniety and Shinto with 
the idea of the Japanese nation. This may be my particular understanding of Pro-
fessor Eisenstadt's emphasis on the Non-Axiality of Japanese civilization, but the 
book brings immediately to my mind the importance of the survival of the tradi-
tions of the native beliefs, practices, which are formulated from the heritage of 
the Shinto religion during the modern period as a framework for the self ex-
planation of national identity that the Japanese have been constructing. It con-
flicted at the same time with their own modern desire for universality in the 
Japanese quest for modernity as an Asian phenomenon. It is this tension between 
the irrevocable components of the ideology of modern Japanese identity both as a 
sacral self at home that however has had universal claims abroad in Asia which is 
the interesting component Japanese modernity. The history of Japanese national-
ism had a different profile on the Asian mainland than the sacral image at home. 
The crude reflections of this universal claim was represented in such slogans as 
Hakkoichiu (the eight corners of the world united) that was used by the Japanese 
nationalist imperialists to justify the foundation of an East Asian Co-Prosperity 
Sphere during the Second World War. However, the slogan has its roots in the 
Meiji era, and the Japanese political and intellectual involvement in Asian revolu-
tions was quite deep: The ups and downs of which remain to be studied. 
Japanese nationalism abroad was Asianism as a universal message, albeit with 
danger to the takers, that acted as a de-stabilizing factor by destroying the ing-
rained interests of older empires in Asia by helping Asian liberation. 10/(John 
W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (Pantheon 
Books, New York, 1993), p.178) 
     Attempts to see the European comparability of Japanese modernity for ex-
ample by searching for the roots of the Japanese work ethic in Tokugawa ideolo-
gy to explain the emergence of Japanese capitalism in compatible terms with that 
of Protestant Europe has also silenced the role of the Shinto religion both as an 
ideology as well as a social praxis of communal life: Specifically the role of the 
Japanese ideology of Shinto as religion in the construction of modernity. The 
overemphasis on the Western oriented heritage of Modern Japan from the early 
Meiji era also had silenced the dynamic process of Asianism that begins with the 
late Meiji period and developes as the idea of Modernity in the twentieth century 
which was defeated with the war, but before the war it was perhaps more potent 
than the Westernist early Meiji heritage in taking the message of Japanese mod-
ernity abroad. How this historical phenomena of sacral, primordial identity is to 
be reconciled with the loud voice of the modern Japanese which saw the role of 
Japan as also universal as an Asianist vision is an issue that needs to be probed
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further. For the modern Japanese, as we see in their writings, this new Japan 
was not only a part of the history of the construction of modernity, but for 
many, especially in the pre-war era, Japan was to be total modernity: Even more 
modern and universalistic than the West. For the Japanese nationalists of the pre-
war era the slogan was surpassing modernity (kindai no chokoku) that brought a 
special modernist ideology to the ideology of imperial loyalty and the sacral ori-
gins of the imperial household. The ambition to be more modern than the estab-
lished modernity of the imperialist West, was the motivating agenda of the 
nationalists as well as the leftists some of whom were invariably interested in the 
compatibility of the vision, hence their collaboration at times with the empire-
building agenda in Asia.
     This contradiction invites me to introduce into the analytical framework of 
understanding the modernity of Japanese civilization to be not just the late-comer 
or late-developer form of modernity, but the historical frontiers of modernity in 
the twentieth century that actually destroyed the modernity of the nineteenth 
century, In other words, as is clear from the general framework of this commen-
tary so far, I am taking the idea of modernity for Japan closer to our time to the 
period after the Meiji period which ends in 1912 to the period including the 
Second World War rather than the culmination of Japanese conditions of Mod-
ernity in the Meiji period or simply the post-war period. According to Modris 
Eksteins who creatively argues in his work on the Rites of Spring, taking its title 
from the avant-garde ballet and symphony of Stravinsky that attacked nineteenth 
century sensibilities for romantic music and dance, the Great War (First World 
War) and the Birth of the Modern Age emerged with Germany in Europe, the 
homeland of the avant-garde in the Arts as well as modernity in war and 
economy. Germany represented the frontier of modernity that defied Paris and 
London, the nineteenth century centers of modern civilization in the capitals of 
the colonial imperial powers of the West. By attacking the "West" from the 
frontiers of its modernity, Germany in this destructive fashion brought on the 
twentieth century. I would expand Eksteins's analysis and include Japan into the 
venture of constructing the twentieth century by destroying the nineteenth 
century of the western empires in Asia with its aggressive industrialization and 
imperialism that were more modern than those of the nineteenth century. 
11/(Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), pp.55-90)
     If during the nineteenth century, the vision of Modern Japan for the liberal 
intellectual such as Fukuzawa Yukichi, the founder of Keio University required 
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that Japan catapult itself outside of Asia which is expressed with his slogan of 
"datsu-A", and plunge into Western Civilization, this was not for a pacifist end. 
Fukuzawa as his later works acknowledge also argued that a Modern Japan will 
lead the modernization of Asia out of its slumber in a mission of Enlightenment. 
Many influential Japanese agreed with this one to one relationship from their 
own perspective. The list ranges from British style parliamentarian Count Oku-
ma Shigenobu to the famous politician of civilian party politics of the twenties 
Inukai Tsuyoshi, and the familiar nationalist ideologues such as Tokutomi Soho 
and Okawa Shumei. Despite their important political differences, it is significant 
to note that all had a common agenda for a Japanese Asianist destiny in forming 
a modern empire in Asia as a universal vision which would also liberate the 
Asians from their own nineteenth century: The sociopolitical force which created 
Modern Japan was not just the national polity of sacrality constructed in Tokyo 
for the population of the home islands but also modern Manchukuo constructed 
in Harbin. 
      In conclusion, the work of Professor Eisenstadt is very important for it 
courageously confronts the larger issue of the meaning of Japanese Civilization 
which the specialist is incapable of confronting due to the particularistic approach 
of his / her methodology. It is the difficulty of reconciling these two approaches 
that provides food for the intellectual inquiry to study Japan. For this reader, the 
work has engendered new questions and issues about the understanding of 
Japanese Civilization which has made this commentary possible. The arguments 
about Non-Axial Civilization, conflation of state and society, the primordial, 
ascriptive, sacral nature of society and self-identity, are challenging notions that 
need to be discussed further together with the issues that remain outside of the 
orbit of the book's analysis.
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